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Abstract: The paper analyzes the e¤ects of more intense competi-
tion on rmsincentives to invest in process innovations. We carry out
experiments for two-stage games, where R&D investment choices are
followed by product market competition. As predicted by theory, an
increase in the number of rms from two to four reduces investments.
However, a positive e¤ect is observed for a switch from Cournot to
Bertrand, even though theory predicts a negative e¤ect in the four-
player case. This result reects overinvestment in the Bertrand case.
The results arise both in treatments in which both stages are imple-
mented and in treatments in which only one stage is implemented.
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1 Introduction
Simple two-stage games are often used to derive predictions about the e¤ects
of increasing competition on cost-reducing investments.1 The empirical test
of these predictions is very di¢ cult, and the literature comes to ambiguous
conclusions.2 Therefore, this paper uses laboratory experiments as a com-
plementary research approach to explore whether at least the basic strategic
e¤ects identied in the theoretical models are present in a laboratory setting.
Specically, we consider four di¤erent games where two or four rms can
choose a cost-reducing investment before they engage in Cournot or Bertrand
competition with homogeneous goods. In this fashion, we can explore the
e¤ects of increasing competition both by increasing the number of players and
by switching from Cournot to Bertrand competition. Thus, we can capture
two of the most familiar notions of increasing competition.
The predicted e¤ect of competition on investment is unambiguously neg-
ative for an increase in the number of rms. For a shift from Cournot to
Bertrand competition, the e¤ect is always negative for three rms or more.
In the duopoly case, the e¤ect is positive except for very small investment
costs.
The experiments fully conrm the negative number e¤ects.3 For a switch
from Cournot to Bertrand competition, however, the observed e¤ect is always
positive, even when the predicted e¤ect is negative. This observation relates
to how players deviate from the Nash equilibrium. Whereas investments
are close to the equilibrium in the Cournot case, there is substantial overin-
vestment in the Bertrand case. This overinvestment reinforces the predicted
positive e¤ect in the two-player case, and it turns the predicted negative
e¤ect into a positive e¤ect for the four-player case.
To understand better what drives the results and, in particular, what lies
behind the overinvestment in the Bertrand case, we made an important de-
sign decision. We not only considered treatments with the two-stage struc-
ture of the underlying game, but we also considered one-stage treatments
where subjects investment decisions automatically result in the payo¤s of
the ensuing product-market subgame. This design feature allows us to inves-
1Schmutzler (2007) and Vives (2008) synthesize the existing literature.
2See Gilbert (2006) and Section 2.2 below.
3Importantly, note that our analysis is distinct from the more familiar analysis of
number e¤ects in oligopolies (Huck et al. 2004; Orzen 2008). This literature deals with
the e¤ects on prices and quantities rather than on investments.
1
tigate whether deviations from the equilibrium investments in the two-stage
game are driven exclusively by expected deviations in the product-market
game. As it turns out that the main comparative-statics results arise both
in the one-stage and two-stage treatments, it is unlikely that such expected
second-stage deviations are exclusively responsible for the investment behav-
ior.
Obviously, a simple set of experiments cannot resolve the century-old
debate about the e¤ects of competition on investment. First of all, there are
too many conceptual ambiguities at the theoretical level. Even the denition
of increasing intensity of competition is contentious, some insightful attempts
to structure the debate notwithstanding.4 Second, even if one settles for
a specic notion of increasing competition in two-stage games, there is a
bewildering variety of models to investigate the issue.5 Third, of course,
one can go beyond the two-stage setting and investigate more complicated
dynamic models.6 Finally, one may worry about the external validity of
the laboratory setting as a means of testing predictions about the long-term
strategic decisions of managers in (potentially large) rms.
In spite of all these cautionary remarks, we believe that the subsequent
analysis leads to one important insight: Our laboratory analysis suggests
that behavioral e¤ects may imply a more positive e¤ect of competition on
investment than a purely theoretic analysis would reveal.7 Future work will
have to show how robust these e¤ects are in the lab. More importantly,
perhaps, it will have to show whether the e¤ect is also present in the eld.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes related literature
4Boone (2000) shows that many di¤erent measures of competition share the common
property that increasing competition can be associated with a higher ratio of the prots
between more e¢ cient and less e¢ cient rms.
5Vives (2008) provides a unifying discussion of two-stage games, with the extent of
product di¤erentiation as an inverse measure of competition. Schmutzler (2007) extends
the discussion to other measures of competition.
6For instance, Lee and Wilde (1980) identify a positive e¤ect of the number of rms
on investment per rm in a Bertrand setting, whereas Delbono and Denicolò (1991) nd
a negative e¤ect, even on total investment, in the Cournot case. In a stochastic patent
race preceding product market competition, Delbono and Denicolò (1990) show that in-
vestment in the Bertrand case is unambiguously higher than in the Cournot case. Bester
and Petrakis (1993) show that, with su¢ ciently large horizontal product di¤erentiation,
the innovation incentive is higher under Cournot competition than under Bertrand com-
petition.
7Note that positiveis not supposed to have any welfare interpretation here. In fact,
increasing competition may well induce excessive investment from a welfare perspective.
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and Section 3 contains the theoretical framework. Section 4-6 describes the
experimental design and results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Experimental Literature
2.1.1 Existing papers
Some of the ingredients of our approach are familiar from other sources. For
instance, Suetens (2005) considers investment games in a Cournot setting.
She focuses on the di¤erences between investments and the Nash equilibrium,
and specically on the role of knowledge spillovers in this context. The
e¤ects of increasing competition are not a matter of concern. Isaac and
Reynolds (1988, 1992) consider the number e¤ects. They deal with stochastic
static and dynamic patent races, and they show that an increase in the
group size lowers investment per rm and raises aggregate investment. Sacco
and Schmutzler (2009) also analyze Cournot investment games, but they are
concerned with the e¤ects of increasing competition by changing the degree
of competition in a di¤erentiated product market. They expose a U-shaped
relation in the underlying Shubik-Levitan model, and they provide weak
experimental evidence in favor of such a relation.
Sacco and Schmutzler (2008) consider the reduced one-stage version of
a two-stage Bertrand game, where investments precede price competition.
They show that overinvestment is substantial. However, there, they also
do not deal with the e¤ects of increasing competition.8 More broadly, our
Bertrand investment experiments are related to the literature on all-pay auc-
tions: Even when all players invest a positive amount, only one player can
make positive prots. However, contrary to standard all-pay auctions, the
size of the bids a¤ects not only the chances of winning, but also the prize.
In particular, at least in the one-stage version, when the di¤erence to the
second-highest bid is close to zero, so is the winners prize. In spite of these
di¤erences in the strategic setting, our experimental observations are similar
to those that are familiar from the xed-prize all-pay auctions. Most closely
related is Gneezy and Smorodinsky (2006) who consider symmetric all-pay
8The theoretical part of the paper deals more generally with all-pay auctions with
negative prize externalities. The Bertrand investment game used in the experiment is a
special case of the general set-up.
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auctions with 4, 8, and 12 players and also observe overinvestment. Like
us, these authors obtain overbidding that diminishes over time, but remains
substantial even in later periods.9 Summing up, even though the equilibrium
structure of the one-stage Bertrand investment game di¤ers substantially
from the xed-prize case, the experimental observations, in particular, the
overbidding phenomenon, are quite similar.
2.1.2 Our contribution
Our approach di¤ers from the existing literature in several important ways.
First, we are not aware of any study that uses a simple unied frame-
work that analyzes the e¤ects of increasing competition both in the sense
of increasing the number of rms and of moving from Cournot to Bertrand
competition. Existing work on investment games has focused exclusively
on Cournot competition or on non-standard models, and it is not directly
comparable. Also, the existing individual contributions are cast in di¤erent
frameworks, making them hard to compare. Whereas Suetens (2005) consid-
ers a standard Cournot framework like us, Isaac and Reynolds (1988, 1992)
deal with stochastic static and dynamic patent races. We are also not aware
of experimental papers comparing Cournot to Bertrand competition.
Second, our paper appears to be the rst one that explicitly juxtaposes the
two-stage and one-stage treatments so as to obtain a better understanding
of deviations from equilibrium in the two-stage game. For instance, this
distinguishes our approach from Suetens (2005) who exclusively focuses on
the two-stage setting, whereas we compare the two-stage and the one-stage
setting.
Third, our analysis suggests one empirical insight that does not follow
from existing papers. It appears that an increase in competition in the sense
of a move from Cournot to Bertrand competition is more likely to have a
positive e¤ect on investments than theory would suggest.
9Other broadly related papers are Davis and Reilly (1998), Millner and Pratt (1989) and
Shogren and Baik (1991). However, unlike us, the last two papers focus on probabilistic
all-pay auctions where higher bids increase the chances of winning, but do not guarantee
it.
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2.2 Field evidence
We see our research as complementary to the existing empirical work, which
comes to ambiguous conclusions about the e¤ects of competition on invest-
ment. The early literature, surveyed in Cohen and Levin (1989), regarded
market structure as an explanatory variable.10 However, the causality might
run in the opposite direction. Innovation may a¤ect market structure because
R&D involves xed costs or because it a¤ects the pattern of rm growth in an
industry. Innovation can also a¤ect market structure indirectly, by increas-
ing or decreasing the e¢ cient scale of production. This endogeneity problem
has been taken into account to some extent by the more recent literature.
This literature nevertheless does not come to unambiguous conclusions. For
instance, Nickell (1996) obtains a positive e¤ect of competition on invest-
ments. In Aghion et al. (2005), an inverted-U relationship between intensity
of competition and investments arises. The ambiguity in the empirical liter-
ature may reect the fact that details in the underlying situation may a¤ect
the relation between competition and investment. An experimental analy-
sis addresses both problems: It allows us to delineate a setting in which the
theoretical predictions are clear and there are no endogeneity problems.
3 The Model
We analyze static two-stage games, where rms i = 1; :::; I rst invest in
R&D and then compete in the product market. The demand function for
the homogeneous product is given by D(p) = a   p, with a > 0. All rms
i are identical ex-ante, with constant marginal costs c > 0. In the rst
stage, rms simultaneously choose R&D investments Yi 2 [0; c), resulting
in marginal costs ci = c   Yi. The cost of R&D is given by kY 2i , where
k > 0. In the second stage, rms simultaneously choose quantities (Cournot
competition) or prices (Bertrand competition).
10For an introduction to more recent evidence, see Gilbert (2006).
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3.1 Cournot Competition
For the Cournot case, backward induction shows that the net payo¤ function
of rm i in the rst stage is given by
i(Y1; :::; YI ; ; k) =

+ IYi  
P
i6=j Yj
I + 1
2
  kY 2i , (1)
where   a  c represents the demand parameter.11
The gross payo¤ of rm i, that is, the rst term on the right-hand side
of (1), depends positively on its own investment and the demand parameter,
and negatively on the investments of the other rms.
Maximizing (1) with respect to Yi yields
@i()
@Yi
=
2I(+ IYi  
P
i6=j Yj)
(I + 1)2
  2kYi  0: (2)
This immediately yields the following result12:
Proposition 1 Under Cournot competition the symmetric pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium investment levels are
Y C =
I
k(I + 1)2   I : (3)
By (3), equilibrium investments are increasing in the demand parameter
, and decreasing in the cost parameter k and in the number of rms I.
3.2 Bertrand Competition
For Bertrand Competition, backward induction shows that the net payo¤
function of rm i can be written as a function of e¢ ciency levels as follows:
i() =

(Yi   Y m i)D(c  Y m i)  kY 2i ; if Yi > Y m i
 kY 2i ; if Yi  Y m i ; (4)
where Y m i = maxj 6=i Yj: Compared to the Cournot case, competition is in-
tense in the sense that a rm can achieve a positive gross payo¤ only by
11Here and in the following, we assume that + IYi  
P
i 6=j Yj  0.
12We assume that the second order condition holds, that is, I2=(I + 1)2   k < 0, which
is fullled for arbitrary I  2 if k > 1.
6
investing more than the highest investment of the others. If Yi > Y m i ; maxi-
mizing (4) with respect to Yi gives
@i()
@Yi
= D(c  Y m i)  2kYi  0: (5)
Yi  Y m i can only be a best response if Yi = 0 holds: If rm i does not
invest more than all others, it gets a negative net payo¤. In such a case
the deviation to Yi = 0 is protable. The pure-strategy equilibrium is thus
characterized as follows.
Proposition 2 (i) Under Bertrand Competition, for k > 1
2
, there are multi-
ple asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria with one rm investing Y Bi =

2k
and
rms j 6= i investing Y Bj = 0. (ii) There are no other pure-strategy equilibria.
For the simple proof, we refer the reader to Sacco and Schmutzler (2008,
Prop. 7).
Proposition 2 implies that the average equilibrium investment level is
given by
Y
B
=

2kI
; (6)
which is increasing in the demand parameter, and decreasing in the cost
parameter k and in the number of rms I.
It is unlikely that agents can coordinate on one of the asymmetric pure-
strategy equilibria, in particular, because only the investor obtains positive
payo¤s. In the experimental analysis, we therefore refer to the following
result of Sacco and Schmutzler (2008).
Proposition 3 The investment game with Bertrand Competition has a sym-
metric mixed-strategy equilibrium, where rms mix between all strategies up
to a cut-o¤ level.13
Of course, one may be concerned with the relevance of mixed-strategy
equilibria in the context of an oligopoly with a small number of players.
We clearly do not expect decision makers in rms to randomize deliberately.
13The game also has asymmetric mixed-strategy equilibria where some rms always play
zero and others randomize.
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Also, the common justication that mixed-strategy equilibria describe behav-
ior in large populations of players, each of which takes non-random decisions,
makes no sense in our context. A more convincing a priori justication relies
on standard purication arguments (Harsanyi 1973).14
3.3 The E¤ects of Increasing Competition
We now consider the predicted e¤ects of competition on investment.
Corollary 1 The average equilibrium investments are decreasing in I for
both Bertrand and Cournot competition.
Similarly, comparing (3) to (6), the following result arises.
Corollary 2 Suppose that k > max
n
1
2
; I
2
(I+1)2
o
. The average equilibrium
investment for Cournot is higher than the average investment in each asym-
metric pure-strategy equilibrium for Bertrand for I  3. For I = 2, average
investments are higher for Bertrand unless k  2.
Though we cannot provide such results for the mixed-strategy equilibrium
at this level of generality, a similar statement holds for the parameters we
choose (see 4.2). Thus, except for the caveat for I = 2, for both concepts of
competitiveness, an increase in competition reduces investment.
Both of these changes in the competitive environment have the common
feature that they correspond to reductions in the mark-ups that rms can
command in the product market. To see the crucial di¤erence, note that
an increase in the number of competitors in a Cournot setting has a fairly
smooth e¤ect on the nature of competition. Most importantly, both rms
can obtain positive prots before and after the change in competition. As one
moves from Cournot to Bertrand, the change in the competitive environment
is more dramatic: It is well known that at most one rm can obtain a positive
prot in the Bertrand investment game when both rms choose equilibrium
prices in the ensuing subgame; so that competition is of a winner-takes-all
nature. Thus, without correct expectations about competitor investments
14Specically, one can consider a Bayesian game with a continuum of players with sta-
tistically independent types, reecting small di¤erences in payo¤s. The mixed-strategy
equilibrium of the complete information game is then close to the equilibria of nearby
Bayesian games.
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players may easily take very bad decisions. This strategic complexity is
reected in the equilibrium structure. While the Cournot investment game
has a unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium, the Bertrand game has
multiple asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria, a symmetric mixed-strategy
equilibrium and even asymmetric mixed-strategy equilibria. Therefore, it is
not all obvious how players coordinate in a static setting. Perhaps the most
plausible equilibrium candidate is the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium.
We use this benchmark to predict equilibrium investments in the Bertrand
game, whereas we resort to the symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium in the
Cournot case.
4 Experimental Design
4.1 Treatments
We conducted eight treatments (see Table 1), which di¤ered in the following
three dimensions:
1. The number of players (two vs. four)
2. The mode of competition (Bertrand vs. Cournot)
3. The number of stages played out (one vs. two)
Type of competition
Number of players Bertrand Cournot
I = 2 B2, 2 sessions C2, 2 sessions
I = 4 B4, 2 sessions C4, 2 sessions
Note, for each treatment we ran one session with one stage and one with two stages
played out. The two (four) player sessions consist each of 36 (32) subjects grouped
into nine (four) matching groups.
Table 1: Treatments
The need for the rst two treatment variations is obvious given our ques-
tions of interest. The third point requires some clarication. Clearly, to
capture the models introduced in Section 3 accurately, the two-stage treat-
ments are adequate. Unfortunately, in such treatments, there may be con-
fusion about the source of possible deviations from the equilibrium in the
9
investment game. Broadly, one can imagine two classes of deviations. First,
subjects may be expecting non-equilibrium behavior in the product market
stage.15 For instance, they might expect that all parties (including them-
selves) collude below the equilibrium output in the Cournot game, in which
case they should rationally choose lower than equilibrium investments in the
rst stage. Second, even when they do not expect such deviations in the
product market game, players may want to deviate from equilibrium invest-
ments for other reasons. For instance, they might realize that investments
involve negative externalities, and they may want to coordinate on lower in-
vestments that make both players better o¤ than equilibrium investments
would.
To be able to identify which of these two types of deviations are rele-
vant, we conducted all treatments in two di¤erent ways. Like Halbheer et
al. (forthcoming), we considered one-stage treatments, in which players only
choose investment levels, and we assumed that payo¤s for each choice of in-
vestments correspond to the payo¤s in the equilibrium of the ensuing product
market game. In these treatments, deviations from equilibrium cannot re-
sult from expected deviations in the product market game, because behavior
in this game corresponds to equilibrium values. In addition, we considered
two-stage treatments in which players had to play the product market game
as well. Thus, we can identify to which extent deviations in the two-stage
game are attributable to each source of deviations.
4.2 Parameters and Predictions
We chose parameter values  = 30 and k = 3. In the experiments, we re-
stricted the strategy sets to Yi 2 f0; 1; :::; 9g. Restricting choices to discrete
strategies had two main advantages. First, we could present information on
payo¤s (gross of investment costs) in simple matrices. Second, in this fash-
ion, the integers no longer play the role of prominent numbers. The downside
is that the equilibria of the game with the discrete strategy set are (2; 2) for
the two-player Cournot game and (2; 2; 2; 2) for the four-player game, so that
a change in the number of players has no e¤ect on predicted per-player in-
vestments. However, this comparative-statics prediction of zero e¤ects relies
on an extremely mechanical application of the Nash equilibrium. As many
15Such deviations are known to arise both in the Bertrand case (Dufwenberg and Gneezy,
2000) and in the the Cournot case (Huck et al. 2004, and many others).
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experiments have shown, comparative-statics predictions of discrete games
are problematic. Often parameter changes in such games do not a¤ect the
equilibrium, even though economic intuition strongly suggests that behavior
should change.16 It appears likely that this standard problem of comparative-
statics predictions in discrete games arises in our model as well. Intuitively,
marginal investment incentives, given by the derivative of gross prots with
respect to e¢ ciency levels, are higher for each player in the Cournot game
with two players than with four players.17 Economic intuition therefore sug-
gests that the e¤ect of increasing the number of players should be negative
rather than zero as the comparison of the equilibria of the discrete games
would predict.18 The simplest way to obtain this negative e¤ect is by view-
ing the players as playing a continuous game: In the Nash equilibrium of the
continuous version of the two-player game, investments are higher than for
the four-player game (2:4 > 1:69). We nd this prediction much more con-
vincing than the prediction that the equilibrium is una¤ected by a change
in the number of players. Even when each player can only choose discrete
investment levels, the average behavior can well be continuous.
For Bertrand competition, according to Proposition 2, there are asymmet-
ric equilibria, each with one rm investing 5 and the other rm(s) 0. This
holds both for the discrete and continuous strategy set. Moreover, accord-
ing to Sacco and Schmutzler (2008)19, the two-player game has a symmetric
mixed-strategy equilibrium (MSE) given by
(p0; :::; p9) = (0:1; 0:193; 0:187; 0:182; 0:176; 0:160; 0; 0; 0; 0) : (7)
For the four-player game, the symmetric MSE is given by
(p0; :::; p9) = (0:464; 0:2; 0:119; 0:088; 0:071; 0:057; 0; 0; 0; 0) : (8)
16For instance, some of the examples in Goeree and Holt (2001) have this property, in
particular, the two proposal games (Goeree and Holt (2001), p.1411-1412), in which the
responders payo¤s are modied strongly, but without a¤ecting his best response. The
observed behavior changes massively.
17For instance, in a symmetric situation where e¢ ciency levels are Y for all players,
the respective derivatives are 49 (30 + Y ) in the two-player case and
8
25 (30 + Y ) in the
four-player case.
18Schmutzler (2007) formalizes this intuition. He gives general conditions under which
an increase in the number of players (weakly) reduces the investments of players in an
investment game. These conditions hold in the example.
19Sacco and Schmutzler (2008) provide an algorithm for calculating the equilibria.
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The expected investment level is 2:62 for the two-player and 1:27 for the
four-player Bertrand game. Note that the expected investment levels are
close to the average investments (Y
B2
= 2:5; Y
B4
= 1:25). As long as one
is only concerned with average behavior, the di¤erence between the di¤erent
types of equilibria is thus marginal.
The following Table provides an overview of the predicted equilibrium
investments:
Equilibrium investment
Model discrete continuous mixed
Cournot I = 2 (2, 2) (2.4, 2.4) -
Cournot I = 4 (2, 2, 2, 2) (1.69, 1.69, 1.69, 1.69) -
Bertrand I = 2 (5, 0) (5, 0) (2.62, 2.62)
Bertrand I = 4 (5, 0, 0, 0) (5, 0, 0, 0) (1.27, 1.27, 1.27, 1.27)
Note, the mixed equilibria are expected investment levels, see equations (7) and (8)
Table 2: Equilibria
With the equilibria we derive four hypotheses about the e¤ects of increas-
ing competition.
Hypothesis 1a In the Cournot case, increasing competition in the sense of
switching from 2 to 4 players reduces investments.
We repeat that this prediction is based on the equilibria of the continuous
version of the game.20
Hypothesis 1b In the Bertrand case, increasing competition in the sense of
switching from 2 to 4 players reduces investments.
The next set of results concerns the e¤ects of switching from Cournot to
Bertrand competition.
Hypothesis 2a For two-player games, increasing competition in the sense
of switching from Cournot to Bertrand competition increases investments.
Hypothesis 2b For four-player games, increasing competition in the sense
of switching from Cournot to Bertrand competition reduces investments.
20For the discrete equilibria, competition has no e¤ect.
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We note that these last two predictions can be substantiated by using the
equilibria of the discrete game as well as those of the continuous game. All
predictions also hold both for the asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria and
the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria.
4.3 Details
The experimental sessions were conducted between November 2008 and Feb-
ruary 2009 at the University of Zurich. The participants were undergraduate
students.21
We implemented four sessions with Bertrand treatments, and four with
Cournot treatments (see, Table 1). Two of the Bertrand and two of the
Cournot sessions were two-player treatments. In each session there were
20 periods. No subject participated in more than one session. The four-
player sessions had 36 players; the two-player sessions had 32 players each.22
Sessions lasted about 90 minutes each.
At the end of each period, subjects were informed about the investment
level and their own net payo¤ for that period. When the second stage was
played out as well, they also learnt the price or the quantity decision of
the other group member(s). In each session, participants received an initial
endowment of CHF 35 (EUR 23). Average earnings including the endow-
ment were CHF 36 (EUR 23) for the B2 one-stage session and CHF 32.13
(EUR 21) for the B4 one-stage session. For the Bertrand two-stage ses-
sions the earnings were CHF 30 (EUR 20) for the two-player session and
CHF 30 (EUR 20) for the four-player session. The amounts for the C2
and C4, one-stage sessions were CHF 49 (EUR 33) and CHF 39 (EUR
26), respectively. For the Cournot two-stage sessions the amounts were CHF
49 (EUR 32) for the two-player session and CHF 39 (EUR 26) for the
four-player session. The experiment was programmed and conducted with
the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and subjects were recruited using
ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
21We did not exclude any disciplines. We had students of law, engineering, psychology,
economics etc.
22In the four-player (two-player) treatments, we formed matching groups with eight
(four) players each. Thus, we had a total of 52 matching groups.
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5 Results
In this section, we present our experimental results. First, we provide a brief
overview of the results in Section (5.1). Second, we look in detail at our
hypotheses in Section (5.2).
5.1 Overview
Using matching group averages as independent observations,23 Kruskal-Wallis
tests reveal that we can reject the hypothesis that the investment levels of
all treatments, of all one-, or of all two-stage treatments are drawn from the
same population.24 We explore the di¤erences between the treatments in the
following.
Figure 1 provides a rst idea of how investments vary across treatments.
Each panel contains the average per-period investments for the four cases of
interest, distinguishing between the one-stage and the two-stage treatments.
It also shows the equilibrium investments. Based on this descriptive evidence,
we arrive at the following tentative conclusions.
1a. As predicted, increasing competition in the sense of increasing the num-
ber of players leads to lower average investments in the Cournot case.
1b. As predicted, increasing competition in the sense of increasing the num-
ber of players leads to lower average investments in the Bertrand case.
These results are supported by pairwise Mann-Whitney-U tests. We nd
signicant di¤erences between the C2 and C4 as well as between the B2 and
B4 treatments.25
23In the following we always use matching groups as independent observations for the
nonparametric tests.
24The null-hypothesis of no di¤erences is rejected with a p-value of 0.000, if all treatments
are considered. If we take only the one (two)-stage treatments into account the p-value is
0.006 (0.000)
25One-tailed tests reject the null hypothesis of no di¤erences in average investments in
favor of higher investment levels in C2 (B2) than in C4 (B4) at a p-value of 0.025 (0.048)
for the one-stage treatments, and respectively at a p-value of 0.010 (0.003) for the two-
stage treatments. Pooling the data of the one- and two-stage treatments results a p-value
of 0.001 (0.000).
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Figure 1: Average investment per period
2a. As predicted, increasing competition in the sense of moving fromCournot
to Bertrand competition leads to greater average investments for the
two-player treatments.26
2b. Contrary to the prediction, increasing competition in the sense of mov-
ing from Cournot to Bertrand competition leads to greater average
investments for the four-player treatments.27
26This result is supported by a one-tailed Mann-Whitney-U test for the two-player one-
stage (p=0.005) and two-stage treatments (p=0.000) and for the pooled data (p=0.000).
27A one-tailed Mann-Whitney-U test weakly rejects the hypothesis of no di¤erences in
investment levels between the two four-player treatments with a p-value of 0.100 for the
one-stage and it rejects the null with a p-value of 0.014 for the two-stage treatments. The
null-hypothesis of no di¤erence is rejected with a p-value of 0.001 if we pool the data.
However the mean ranks are always higher in B4 than in C4.
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Hence, in terms of competition e¤ects, there is one important devia-
tion from the theoretical prediction: The e¤ect of moving from Cournot
to Bertrand competition is unambiguously positive.
Of course, we would also like to understand the sources of the deviation
more clearly. Several additional observations are helpful in this respect.
3. The comparative statics results 1a-2b appear are similar for one-stage
and two-stage treatments. Moreover, even the observed investment
levels in the one-stage and two-stage treatments are quite similar. Two-
tailed Mann-Whitney-U tests do not reject the null hypothesis of no
di¤erences in investment levels for the one- and two-stage four-player
treatments (B4: p=0.343, C4: p=0.200). However, the hypothesis
is weakly rejected for both two-player treatments (B2: p=0.073, C2:
p=0.077).
The deviation from the theoretical prediction 2b arises in both treatment
variants. It can therefore not result exclusively from subjectsconsiderations
about possible deviations from equilibrium in the product market game.
Our next observation concerns the relation between investments and equi-
librium predictions.
4. Whereas observed investments correspond to equilibrium predictions
quite well in the Cournot treatments, there is substantial overinvest-
ment in the Bertrand case in all treatments. In the C2 one-stage treat-
ment we observe 4.75% overinvestment and 14.74% in the C4 treatment.
However, in the two-stage treatments we observe 7.58% underinvest-
ment in the C2 and 7.08% underinvestment in the C4 treatment. For
the Bertrand treatments, we observe 18.21% overinvestment in the one-
stage two-player treatment and 35.44% overinvestment in the two-stage
case. For four players, we have 90.70% overinvestment in the one-stage
treatment and 101.28% overinvestment in the two-stage treatment.
Understanding the sources of positive competition e¤ects that are stronger
than predicted thus essentially boils down to understanding why subjects
choose above-equilibrium investments in the Bertrand case. Section 6 will
therefore provide a more detailed analysis of these sources.
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5.2 Comparative Statics
In the following, we provide a more careful statistical analysis, focusing on
the comparative statics e¤ects.
5.2.1 Number e¤ects
We now investigate the number e¤ects in more detail. First, we consider
OLS models28 of all Cournot treatments as well as of the one- and two-stage
treatments separately. The model is given by
yit = 0 + 1
i
I4 + 2
i
P1 5 + 3
i
P6 10 + 4
i
P11 15 + 5
i
one stage + e
i
t; (9)
where iI4 is a dummy variable for intense competition (four players rather
than two), and iP1 5, 
i
P6 10, 
i
P11 15 are dummy variable for the rst, second,
and third quarter of periods. If we use the data of all treatments, we consider
an additional dummy variable ione stage which is equal to one for the one-
stage treatments.
(1) (2) (3)
investment investment investment
I4 -0.575 (0.186) -0.648 (0.184) -0.611 (0.128)
P1-5 0.415 (0.138) 0.682 (0.149) 0.549 (0.106)
P6-10 0.141 (0.103) 0.265 (0.0675) 0.203 (0.0635)
P11-15 0.0529 (0.0690) 0.0471 (0.0436) 0.0500 (0.0399)
one-stage 0.330 (0.128)
constant 2.362 (0.112) 1.970 (0.106) 2.001 (0.106)
N 1360 1360 2720
R2 0.082 0.113 0.113
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for matching group clusters.
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Table 3: Number e¤ects in the Cournot treatments
The rst column in Table 3 deals only with the one-stage data. It shows
that the estimated coe¢ cient for 1 is  0:575 and highly signicant. If we
consider only the two-stage Cournot treatments (Column (2)), we obtain a
28We correct the standard error for matching group clusters in all OLS models presented
in the following.
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highly signicant 1 of  0:648. The estimated e¤ect is slightly lower than
the predicted e¤ect which is 0:71 both in one- and two-stage treatments.
Using a t-test, we cannot reject the null-hypothesis of no di¤erence between
the two estimated coe¢ cients (t = 0:2790). Thus, the comparative statics
are essentially the same in one-stage and two-stage treatments. However,
considering all treatments (Column (3)), we nd a signicant positive e¤ect of
being in a one-stage treatment. Thus, the level of investment is higher in the
one-stage games. The time e¤ects captured by the period dummies suggests
that investments are higher initially than later on which holds independent
of the data selection.
Summing up, we obtain the following conrmation of Hypothesis 1a.
Result 1a For Cournot competition, investments are higher for two players
than for four. Even though investment levels in one-stage and two-stage
treatments di¤er, there is no signicant di¤erence in the size of the number
e¤ect across treatments.
It is instructive to compare our results with the number e¤ects obtained
in standard Cournot output games. These games are structurally very simi-
lar to the one-stage version of the investment game, in that they also feature
strategic substitutes and negative externalities.29 Because of the latter prop-
erty, players choose more output than under joint-prot maximization in the
Nash equilibrium. Also, per-player output is decreasing in the number of
players (as with investments in our case). Huck et al. (2004) show that this
result is conrmed in the lab, but that it is less pronounced than theory
would predict.30
We now move to number e¤ects for Bertrand competition, correspond-
ing to the two upper panels in Figure 1. The gures clearly suggest that
investments are higher in the two-player game. We carry out the same OLS
regressions as for the Cournot model (see Table 4).
The rst column shows that the e¤ect of the number of players has the
predicted sign and is signicant for the one-stage treatments. Considering
29The strategic substitutes property is standard for the output game. For the investment
game, it follows from equation (2). Intuitively, as the competitor becomes more e¢ cient,
the other rm has lower demand and mark-up in equilibrium. Increasing own mark-up
and demand by becoming more e¢ cient is thus less attractive.
30Note, however, that Huck et al. consider a xed-matching protocol which might foster
collusion (lower outputs) in the two-player case.
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the two-stage treatments in (Column (2)), we nd a slightly stronger e¤ect
which is highly signicant as well.31 Running a t-test reveals that the di¤er-
ence between the two estimated coe¢ cients is not signicant (t = 0:8865).
However the stage e¤ect in Column (3) is weakly signicant and negative.
Again we nd that investment levels are signicantly higher in earlier periods.
(1) (2) (3)
investment investment investment
I4 -0.675 (0.293) -0.992 (0.205) -0.834 (0.179)
P1-5 0.626 (0.313) 1.044 (0.178) 0.835 (0.178)
P6-10 0.491 (0.275) 0.382 (0.131) 0.437 (0.150)
P11-15 0.294 (0.0999) 0.135 (0.173) 0.215 (0.0989)
one-stage -0.302 (0.176)
constant 2.744 (0.161) 3.158 (0.149) 3.102 (0.171)
N 1360 1360 2720
R2 0.026 0.078 0.050
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for matching group clusters.
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Table 4: Number e¤ects in the Bertrand treatments
Summing up, we obtain the following conrmation of Hypothesis 1a.
Result 1b For Bertrand competition, investments are higher for two players
than for four. Even though investment levels in one-stage and two-stage
treatments di¤er, there is no signicant di¤erence in the size of the number
e¤ect across treatments.
5.2.2 Cournot vs. Bertrand
We now consider the e¤ect of moving from comparatively soft Cournot to
intense Bertrand competition. To repeat, the e¤ect of such an increase is
predicted to be positive for two players, but negative for four players. As
reported earlier, comparison of the two left panels in Figure 1 suggests that
the result for the two-player case is indeed borne out in the lab. Next, we
consider OLS models of the one-stage and two-stage treatments separately
and jointly. The model we estimate includes iBert rand as a dummy variable
31However, the e¤ect is smaller than the predicted one, for which we obtain is 2:62  
1:27 = 1:35 using equation (3).
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for intense (Bertrand) competition and, as before, dummy variables for the
rst, second, and third quarter of periods (iP1 5, 
i
P6 10, 
i
P11 15). 
i
one stage
is a dummy variable for the one-stage treatment.
yit = 0+1
i
Bert rand+2
i
P1 5+3
i
P6 10+4
i
P11 15+5
i
one stage+e
i
t. (10)
(1) (2) (3)
investment investment investment
Bertrand 0.583 (0.170) 1.331 (0.217) 0.957 (0.150)
P1-5 0.386 (0.199) 0.783 (0.201) 0.585 (0.144)
P6-10 0.311 (0.215) 0.317 (0.123) 0.314 (0.122)
P11-15 0.147 (0.0674) 0.0333 (0.129) 0.0903 (0.0724)
one-stage -0.0778 (0.150)
constant 2.303 (0.138) 1.935 (0.126) 2.158 (0.127)
N 1440 1440 2880
R2 0.028 0.185 0.084
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for matching group clusters.
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Table 5: E¤ects of the type of competition in two-player treatments
In all three models (Columns (1)-(3) in Table 5) the e¤ect of competition
on investment is positive and highly signicant. In fact, the e¤ect is much
more pronounced than predicted.32 Moreover, the e¤ect is signicantly dif-
ferent between one- and two-stage treatments (t = 2:7135). However, the
stage dummy in model (3) is insignicant. The period dummies show that
investments decrease signicantly as time goes by, independent of the data
selection.
Summing up, we obtain the following conrmation of Hypothesis 2a.
Result 2a As predicted, mean investments are higher for the Bertrand game
with two players than for the corresponding Cournot games, both in the one-
stage and the two-stage treatments. The e¤ect is even stronger than predicted
and signicantly di¤erent for one- and two-stage treatments.
In the four-player case, the comparative statics prediction of Hypothesis
2b is not conrmed. The OLS results are shown in Table 6.
32The theoretical prediction is 1 = 2:62  2:4 = 0:22.
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(1) (2) (3)
investment investment investment
Bertrand 0.483 (0.310) 0.986 (0.172) 0.734 (0.183)
P1-5 0.672 (0.298) 0.953 (0.122) 0.813 (0.160)
P6-10 0.322 (0.227) 0.331 (0.0757) 0.327 (0.115)
P11-15 0.203 (0.128) 0.156 (0.123) 0.180 (0.0859)
one-stage 0.117 (0.183)
constant 1.640 (0.190) 1.210 (0.142) 1.366 (0.170)
N 1280 1280 2560
R2 0.030 0.088 0.056
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for matching group clusters.
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Table 6: E¤ects of the type of competition in four-player treatments
Considering only one-stage treatments (Column (1)), we nd no signi-
cant e¤ect of stronger competition on investment, whereas we get a highly
signicant positive e¤ect in the two-stage treatments (Column (2)) and in
the pooled data (Column (3))33. Using a t-test we cannot reject the null-
hypothesis of no di¤erence of the e¤ect of Bertrand vs. Cournot competition
on investment in one- and two-stage treatments (t = 1:4188). Column (3)
shows that there is no signicant e¤ect of the stage dummy on investment.
Time e¤ects are similar to the two-player case.
Summing up, we cannot conrm Hypothesis 2b.
Result 2b Contrary to the prediction, investments are higher for the Bertrand
game with four players than for the corresponding Cournot games. We nd
no signicant di¤erence in the e¤ect between one- and two-stage treatments.
All results presented above go in the same direction as the statements in
Section 5.1.
6 Understanding Overinvestment
In the following, we try to improve the understanding of our comparative
statics results. As the Cournot case essentially conrms the equilibrium
33The predicted e¤ect is negative, 1.27-1.69=-0.42.
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prediction,34 the crucial question is what lies behind the clear overinvestment
in the Bertrand case. To this end, we point to ve pieces of evidence.
1. There is substantial overinvestment in the one-stage and two-stage
treatments, but it is more pronounced in the latter case.
2. There are strong time e¤ects.
3. There is substantial cross-player heterogeneity.
4. In the four player-treatments, players obtain negative prots on average
in all periods, but the losses are decreasing over time. In the two-player
treatments, average prots are mostly positive.
5. Compared to the mixed-strategy equilibrium, the overinvestment comes
mainly from too low weight on low positive strategies rather than too
low weight on zero.
Considering the question of overinvestment, we ran the following OLS
regression model for all treatments:
4yit = yit   yit = 0 + eit, (11)
with yit standing for the predicted equilibrium investment. If subjects
invest according to our prediction, the estimated constant 0 should be zero.
The results for all treatments are presented in Table 7 in the Appendix.
We nd that there is no signicant over- or underinvestment in the Cournot
treatments, whereas we nd highly signicant overinvestment in all two-
and four-player Bertrand treatments. The overinvestment is higher in the
two-stage and four-player treatments than in the one-stage and two-player
treatments. These results support the descriptive evidence presented at the
end of Section 5.1.
The second point has already been made in Section 5.2.
The third point is illustrated in Figure 2. This gure is a histogram of
average per-player investments in the four Bertrand treatments. The het-
erogeneity across players is quite substantial. Figure 5 in the Appendix
gives individual investment paths for the one-stage two-player treatment and
shows that there also is a tremendous variety with respect to the stability of
34This is similar to Suetens (2005).
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Figure 2: Average observed investment per subject for all four Bertrand
treatments
individual behavior. A considerable fraction of the players had one or two
preferred investment choices that were chosen at least half the time. Almost
as many players hardly ever chose the same investment level twice in a row.
As to the fourth point, consider Figure 3, which shows how prots devel-
oped over times for the one- and two-stage case. The di¤erences between the
two-player and the four-player case are immediately evident. A two-tailed
Mann-Whitney-U test rejects the null hypothesis of no di¤erences between
the one- and two-stage two-player treatments (p = 0:000), but the test cannot
reject the null hypothesis in the four-player case (p = 0:200).
For the fth point, consider Figure 4 in the Appendix. In all treatments,
subjects choose 1 and 2much less frequently than in the MSE. The di¤erences
for zero investments are much smaller, and in one case (B2, one-stage) there
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Figure 3: Average prots over time of all four Bertrand treatments
are more zero investments than predicted by the MSE.
Our observations suggest a number of possible explanations for the over-
investment, all of which would apply both in the one-stage and the two-stage
treatments.
1. Joy of winning: Subjects do not care exclusively about monetary pay-
o¤s, but derive an independent benet from winning the game.
2. E¢ ciency considerations: Subjects deviate from equilibrium in order
to come closer to joint-payo¤ maximization.35
3. Reputation e¤ects: Subjects may have hoped to induce others to refrain
from investing.
35See, e.g., Engelmann and Strobel (2004).
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4. Confusion: Subjects were at least initially unaware of the high risk of
making losses with high investment choices.
5. Optimism: Subjects were aware of the possible losses, but overestimated
the chances that others would choose lower investments.
Given the heterogeneity of individual proles, it seems unlikely that a
single explanation applies to all players. The joy of winning e¤ect, for
instance, is consistent with the observation that subjects tend not to choose
low investment levels if they invest at all. However, because of the substan-
tial reductions in investments over time,36 we can rule out that a joy of
winninge¤ect explains all observations. The joy of winning cannot explain
why investments decrease over time.
E¢ ciency considerations are also not entirely convincing in the present
setting. At least for I = 4, the deviations from equilibrium clearly reduce
joint prots (which are zero in expectation in the mixed-strategy equilib-
rium). For I = 2, however, in most periods, average prots are positive,
so that subjects indeed come closer to joint-prot maximization. Clearly,
joint prot maximization arises in the asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria,
but positive average prots can still be obtained for other asymmetric strat-
egy proles. One might argue that players are trying to coordinate on some
outcome that is closer to joint-prot maximization, but fail to do so in the
four-player case where it is obviously more di¢ cult.
Among the three other explanations, the appeal of reputation e¤ects as
an explanation is of course limited by the fact that player identities were not
common knowledge. The last two explanations are perhaps most compelling.
The prevalence of high investments and negative prots in early periods is
strong, which would appear to be consistent both with confusion and ex-
cessive optimism that fade away over time. Also, it is suggestive that these
e¤ects are stronger in the four-player case, where the strategic uncertainty
is compounded by the fact that three opponents are present in each period.
Finally, as Figure 4 shows, 10-15 % of the investments in all Bertrand treat-
ments are weakly dominated strategies (6 or higher), also suggesting some
degree of confusion.
Although we can rule out explanations of investment behavior that result
exclusively from anticipated deviations in the two-stage game, we still have to
36See regression results in Section 5.2.2.
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deal with the issue of why the comparative-statics e¤ect is more pronounced
in the two-stage case than in the one-stage case. This observation reects two
di¤erent components. First, the overinvestment in the Bertrand case is more
pronounced for the two-stage treatments. Second, while there is a tendency
towards overinvestment in the Cournot game for one-stage treatments, there
is a tendency towards underinvestments in the two-stage treatments.
The underinvestment tendency in the two-stage Cournot treatments ap-
pears to have a plausible explanation. One e¤ect towards underinvestment
that is absent in the one-stage case is that, if subjects expect to collude on
low outputs in the second stage, they will have less need for cost reductions.
This is consistent with the observations: First, because of the underinvest-
ment, average subgame equilibrium outputs corresponding to actual invest-
ment levels are lower than the subgame perfect equilibrium outputs. Second,
average outputs across all two-stage Cournot treatments are even lower than
those average subgame outputs.37
Perhaps the most plausible explanation of the more pronounced overin-
vestment in the two-stage Bertrand case is the greater strategic complexity.
In the one-stage case, subjects should understand immediately from the pay-
o¤ table that at most one player can make positive prots, which should
deter investments. In the two-stage case, the value of an investment may
be positive for both players, but this still requires very special second-stage
actions, namely identical prices above equilibrium for all players. Subjects
may be overestimating the chances that such coordination takes place. In
fact, in the two-stage Bertrand treatments, subjects did not achieve such
coordination in 98:75% of the markets for I = 4, and in 72:22% in the case
I = 2.
7 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the e¤ects of more intense competition on invest-
ments in simple two-stage R&D models. In the rst stage, rms whose
marginal costs are identical ex-ante simultaneously invest in R&D. The in-
vestment leads to a decrease in marginal costs. In the second stage of the
game, rms simultaneously choose quantities or prices in a homogeneous
good market.
37For C2 (C4), average subgame equilibrium outputs are 10:74 (6:31) rather than 10:8
(6:34) as in the subgame perfect equilibrium. Average observed outputs are 10:11 (6:05).
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When more intense competition is modeled as an increase of the number
of rms for a given type of product market competition, the theoretical pre-
diction is that, both for Cournot and for Bertrand competition, an increase
in the number of agents yields lower mean investments. This hypothesis
is conrmed in the lab. When more intense competition is modeled as a
switch from Cournot to Bertrand competition, the observed investments in-
crease, even though the mixed-strategy equilibrium only predicts this in the
two-player case. An important limitation of our analysis concerns the very
long run. As overinvestment tends to coincide with negative earnings in the
Bertrand game, it is not sustainable. Thus, in the very long run, rms must
either adapt their behavior or they will disappear from the market. This
feature is much less pronounced in the Cournot game, where overinvestment
is compatible with positive earnings. One might therefore conjecture that,
in the long run, overinvestment disappears even in the Bertrand case.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Tables
Cournot I = 2, yit = 2:4
(1) (2) (3)
yit y
i
t y
i
t
0 0.114 (0.126) -0.182 (0.135) -0.0340 (0.0966)
N 720 720 1440
Cournot I = 4, yit = 1:69
(1) (2) (3)
yit y
i
t y
i
t
0 0.249 (0.154) -0.120 (0.141) 0.0647 (0.119)
N 640 640 1280
Bertrand I = 2, yit = 2:62
(1) (2) (3)
yit y
i
t y
i
t
0 0.477
 (0.121) 0.929 (0.177) 0.703 (0.118)
N 720 720 1440
Bertrand I = 4, yit = 1:27
(1) (2) (3)
yit y
i
t y
i
t
0 1.152
 (0.297) 1.286 (0.121) 1.219 (0.151)
N 640 640 1280
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for matching group clusters.
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Table 7: Observed and predicted investment
In model (1) we use one-stage data, in model (2) two-stage, and in model
(3) we pool one- and two-stage data.
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8.2 Figures
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Figure 4: Observed investment levels in all Bertrand treatments and pre-
dicted MSE investment levels
29
Figure 5: Investment per subject in the B2, one-stage treatment
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